Abstract
Introduction
Legal scholars have long recognized that contracts should maximize the joint gains or contractual surplus from transactions between parties. In doing so, contracts should satisfy being ex post trade efficient (trade occurs only when value to the buyer exceeds value to the seller), and being ex ante investment efficient in the subject matter of the contract (Schwartz & Scott 2003) . Contracting parties can enhance the ex ante efficiency of their contract by shifting contracting costs between the front end of the transaction (the negotiation and drafting stage) and the back end (the contract enforcement and litigation stage) (Scott & Triantis 2006) . For example, a clause that waives the parties' right to a jury trial should litigation result reduces back end enforcement costs (by reducing the time and expense of a trial as well as errors made by inexperienced juries) and transfers corresponding contracting costs to the front end of the transaction (where the parties must negotiate such an agreement). Theory predicts that sophisticated parties will agree to such clauses when the savings in expected enforcement costs exceed the additional costs of negotiation and drafting. Any efficiency gains from jury waiver clauses would depend, inter alia, on the relative complexity of the contract: ceteris paribus, the more complex the factual context, the more cost savings might be realized from a jury waiver.
But jury waiver clauses may also have distributional as well as efficiency effects.
For example, some parties may believe that they have an advantage over others in persuading a jury rather than a judge of the merits of their claim.
1 This advantage might be particularly true, for example, for firms located in the forum from which the jury pool is drawn. As a consequence, a party may resist agreeing to an efficiency enhancing jury waiver clause if its expected share of any efficiency gains are less than that its expected gain from exploiting its litigation advantage. Additionally, firms might draft jury waiver clauses because substantial ex post litigation costs might have to be incurred because juries have difficulties interpreting vague terms such as "reasonable best efforts" or "material adverse changes" which could lead to large errors (Choi & Triantis 2010) .
Given the possible offsetting effects of jury waiver clauses in particular contexts, one would predict that some contracts would contain jury waiver clauses and others would not. This paper examines the variation in the use of jury waiver clauses in merger and acquisition agreements. 2 The agreement between target and acquirer firms to waive the right to a jury is one means of reducing expected litigation costs in large complex commercial contracts such as merger agreements. In addition to the expected reduction in litigation costs of having a bench trial rather than a jury trial, data show that many corporate managers and business lawyers believe that juries increase variance in trial outcomes because jurors do not fully take into account the evidence and applicable law (Lande 1998) . Juries are also often been viewed as less technically sophisticated and legally knowledgeable than judges, and are believed to be often swayed by extrinsic factors that can lead to larger errors and arbitrary awards.
3
This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals 4 over an 11-year period (2001 to 2011) to determine the factors that explain the ex ante choice to include a jury waiver clause in a merger and acquisition deal. In an interesting inaugural study, Eisenberg and Miller (EM) examined jury trial waivers for 11 different types of commercial contracts for the six month period January 2002 to June 2002 (Eisenberg & 2 For an excellent explanation of other merger and acquisition contract characteristics, see Coates, 2015. 3 For example, jurors might suffer more from behavioral cognitive biases (Sunstein et. al, 2002) ; Ellsworth, 1993) ; Lebine & Lebine1996) ; Jurors might also make moral judgments about the conduct of particular parties and the size of the requested damages award (Sunstein et al, 2002) , (Chapman & Bornsetin, 1996) . Jurors might also be affected by the appearance of the parties and personality of the lawyers (Harris, et al 2006) , (MacCoun, 1990) . Juries might also place too much emphasis on expert testimony and when the expert testifies in more technical terms (Raitz, et al.1990 ), (Horowitz, et al. 2001) . 4 Publicly traded deals are defined as those where both the acquirer and the target firm are traded in U.S. capital markets.
Miller 2007).
5 EM found that jury trial waivers were more likely with greater contract standardization, perceived fairness of juries, and by contract type. In their conclusion, EM state:
We are mindful … this is the first study of its kind and it is important to recognize its limitations. The contracts we study exist in a narrow time period. Ideally, we would like information for periods before and after the first half of 2002. The variation across contract types in the rates of jury trial waiver also suggests that more information and more sophisticated modeling of the decision to include waivers would be fruitful. The details of the relations between the contracting parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses should be studied.
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We address EM's concerns and extend their study by a) examining a large sample that starts in January 2001 and ends in December 2011; b) analyzing merger agreements only, 7 in order to overcome the heterogeneity problem in the EM study; 8 c) analyzing new hypotheses relating jury waiver clauses to the parties' choice of governing law and choice of forum as well as characteristics of law firms representing both bidder and target firms (namely, their reputation and familiarity with each other); and d) analyzing whether bargaining power is related to the probability of a jury waiver clause in the agreement. In doing so, we exclude all mergers that chose Delaware as their state of governing law and forum, given that the Delaware Chancery Court sits always without a jury. We also Third, we find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to include jury waiver clauses, 10 and this effect is more significant for the acquirer's law firm than for the target's law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, industry effects whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of having a jury waiver clause.
It is important to note that our results are based on correlations between quantifiable variables using Probit regression analysis. In no way are we attributing our results to some form of causal claim. In order to do so, we need to identify an exogenous shock that was not expected by the various participants in the merger and acquisitions market place. Clearly, the choice of attorney, choice of jury waiver clause, choice of forum and law clause are endogenously determined. It is extremely hard, and one might also say close to impossible, to identify natural exogenous events which effect one choice 9 Using a larger sample, we find that jury waiver clauses correlate with higher announcement period stock returns for both the target and the combined firm (Palia & Robert E. Scott, 2014) . The result that jury waiver clauses are beneficial and Pareto efficient for the combined firms is consistent with Eisenberg et. al, 2006, and Eisenberg & Wells, 2006) . 10 Data supports that including jury waiver clauses increase the value of the deal, see note 9 supra.
variable and not another choice variable. That said, our empirical approach is consistent with all other studies that examine mergers and acquisitions using regression analysis.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our hypotheses and Section 3 describes our data, empirical methodology, and variables. Our empirical results are reported in Section 4, and conclusions presented in Section 5.
Hypotheses
In this section we construct hypotheses that correlate with the probability of the merger deal having a jury waiver clause.
Choice of Forum and Choice of Law
Merging firms that choose a state for dispute resolution opt into a judicial system, a cohort of judges and a jury pool. They accomplish this by negotiating a choice of forum clause. If the merging firms believe a state's judges are experienced and knowledgeable when compared to other states, they will tend to choose that state as the forum for any litigation over the contract and will more likely negotiate for a jury waiver clause.
Additionally, if the merging firms believe that the chosen state's jury pool is fair and balanced, as compared to other states they will be less likely to negotiate a jury waiver (Eisenberg & Miller 2007a , Cain & Davidoff 2012 .
The choice of using a jury rather than a judge to decide the facts may be influenced by the extent to which the jury will be required to evaluate evidence of the meaning of the agreement from sources extrinsic to the written agreement. Here the choice of forum can also implicate the parties' option to choose the rules of contract interpretation that will govern contract disputes. A choice of law clause in a merger agreement is typically paired with the choice of forum provision in a single contract term that designates the same state as the exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes as well as the source of governing law. 11 Choices of law clauses permit parties to select either "textualist" or "contextualist" rules of interpretation. Textualist jurisdictions, such as New York, use a "hard" parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger or integration clauses, and, in their absence, presume that the contract is fully integrated if it appears final and complete on its face. 12 In the same spirit, the textualist approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to impart non-standard meaning to language that, read alone, is unambiguous. 13 From the textualist perspective, therefore, the parol evidence and plain meaning rules are tools with which the contracting parties can control the evidence courts will use to interpret the portion of their agreement that they intend to make legally enforceable. Contextualist jurisdictions, such as California, 14 reject the notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguouscontext free-meaning at all. By the same logic they favor a soft parol evidence rule.
Here the test for integration admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause declaring the contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause, 11 The typical merger agreement contains both choice of forum and choice of law provisions, most often combined in a single contract term. See e.g. Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization among Chordiant Software, Inc., Puccini Acquisition Corp., and Prime Response, Inc. , January 8, 2001. 9.5 Applicable Law: Jurisdiction. This agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware, regardless of the laws that might otherwise govern under applicable principles of conflicts of laws thereof. In any action between any of the parties arising out of or relating to the Agreement: (a) each of the parties irrevocably and unconditionally consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state and federal courts located in the state of Delaware… A random search in our sample of merger agreements yielded only five agreements where the choice of forum and choice of law terms appeared as separate terms of the contract. In each of the five cases, the agreements identified the same state as the forum state and the source of governing law.
12 See, e.g., Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) ("Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract containing a merger clause.") 13 The plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning should be attributed to the contract terms that the parol evidence rule has identified. As with the division over hard and soft parol evidence rules, courts have divided on the question whether express contract terms should be given a contextual or a plain meaning interpretation. Under the latter practice, when words or phrases appear to be unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is inadmissible (Schwartz & Scott 2010 
Attorney familiarity
If attorneys for both the target and acquirer firm are from the same state, they might be more familiar with relevant state law and with each other. As a consequence of the pre-existing relationship of their representatives, the merging firms may be less likely to litigate their disagreements and more likely to settle (Klausner 1995 , Kahan & Klausner 1997 , Johnston & Waldfogel 2002 . Settlement may be easier to achieve in a bench trial rather than a jury trial as the variance in the parties' estimation of their case is smaller in the former case.
Hypothesis 2: Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the attorneys are from the same state.
Additionally, it seems reasonable that local attorneys might expect a local jury to favor it over non-local counterparties. For example, an attorney from the same state as the where the firm is headquartered might prefer a jury from that state for beneficial jurisdiction over a non-local attorney.
Hypothesis 2.2(b):
Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the attorneys and the firm's headquarters are from the same state.
Attorney reputation
Attorneys associated in a law firm with a high reputation for legal skill and experience are likely to be more confident in their ability to negotiate merger deals that are favorable to their clients' interests. To protect the advantage that they anticipate being able to secure in negotiating the terms of the merger agreement, they would prefer to have the case litigated before a judge rather than a jury. A judge's superior understanding of legal issues increases the probability that any advantage gained through negotiating a (clearly written) agreement would be sustained in court. 
Bargaining power
Contracts are often based on the bargaining power of the parties involved. If both the acquirer and the target firm are of the same size they might a priori believe that they have been fairly represented in merger negotiations. On the other hand, if for example, the acquirer is of a larger size and consequently has greater bargaining power, such acquirers might insists that the smaller target firm waive its right to a jury trial.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will be more frequent when the bidding firm is of a much larger size than the target firm.
International acquiring firms
Some studies have found that international firms prefer arbitration to litigation (Eisenberg & Miller 2007b) . To the extent that this preference reflects a reluctance to rely on non-expert juries to resolve commercial disputes, the fact that the acquiring firm is unfamiliar with and uneasy about relying on U.S. juries should be positively correlated with the frequency of jury waiver clauses in the merger agreement. 
Definitions and sources for variables
Our dependent variable is if the deal had a jury waiver clause, or not. We manually examined merger agreements to collect this variable. We also collected data from the merger agreements on whether the deal had an arbitration clause. There were very few mergers with arbitration clauses (seven mergers), so we categorized is it as a jury waiver clause.
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We describe below the definition, construction and data source for the various independent variables used in our regression (see Table 2 for a summary To examine the bargaining power hypothesis, we need to calculate the relative size of the merging firms. In order to calculate this variable, we define the variable Relative size to be the natural logarithm of the market value of the target firm less the natural logarithm of the market value of the bidder firm. These market values are calculated from CRSP on the last day of the estimation period (t =-60).
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We define a dummy variable A_international which is set to unity if SDC states that the acquirer is an international bidder. For US bidders A_international is set to zero.
We also include a number of control variables. The first is a dummy variable, Completed, that is set to unity if the deal was completed, and zero otherwise. We also include 18 dummy variables, nine for acquirers and nine for target firms to control for the industry of each firm. We use the firm's four-digit SIC code to map into the 10 Fama-French industries. 22 The nine dummy variables for acquirers are: A_cons_nondur which is set to unity for consumer nondurables (food, tobacco, textiles apparel, leather and toys), and zero otherwise; A_cons_dur which set to unity for consumer durables (cars, tv's, furniture, household appliances), and zero otherwise; A_manuf which is set to unity for manufacturing industries, and zero otherwise; A_energy which is set to unity for the oil, gas and coal industries, and zero otherwise; A_high_tech which is set to unity for high technology companies, and zero otherwise; Telecom which is set to unity for the television and transmission industries, and zero otherwise; A_shops which is set to unity for wholesale and retail shops, and zero otherwise; A_health which is set to unity for the healthcare industry, and zero otherwise; and A_utilities which is set to unity for the utilities industry, and zero otherwise. All other industries are set to zero in the above nine industry variables. A similar algorithm is implemented for target industries, with each industry name beginning with T_ instead.
Empirical Results

Descriptive statistics
We begin by documenting the incidence of jury waiver and arbitration clauses in our sample. We find that jury waiver clauses are quite ubiquitous in the merger agreements, with 133 out of 276 (48.2%) having a jury waiver clause. In Table 3 , we present the descriptive statistics of the independent variables that we will use in our When we examine the relative size of the two merging firms, we find that the average target firm is 11.4% of the market capitalization of the bidder firm. We find that 6% of our mergers involved an acquirer that was an international firm that is traded in the U.S. capital markets. Most of our sample (91%) involve deals that were completed. When we examine the various industries bidders are from, we find more bidders from hightechnology and health industries. We also find target firms to be more concentrated in manufacturing, high-technology and health industries. significance. Given that the first two proxy variables, are ranks based on profits per partner and Vault, they are highly positively correlated; 0.86 for acquirers and 0.82 for targets, respectively. New York law firms are found to have a higher rank (a lower value denoting a higher rank; for example, the first ranked law firm gets the value one, the second ranked law firm gets the value two, and so on). Therefore New York law firms have a negative correlation with the other lawyer reputation variables. Given the high correlations between the lawyer reputation proxy variables, we include them separately in the regressions.
Determinants of jury waiver clauses
***Table 4***
We now estimate a Probit model to determine the ex ante choice of merger partners to include a jury waiver clause in their merger agreement. In doing so, we include a comprehensive list of independent variables in our regression specification, the results of which are given in Table 5 . In column (1), law firm reputation is proxied by the rank of the law firm based on profits per partner, in column (2) law firm reputation is proxied by the Vault rank of the law firm, and in column (3) whether the law firm is a New York law firm. Panel A presents the regression estimates and standard errors which are corrected using the Huber-White sandwich estimators that control for lack of normality and heteroscedasticity. For ease of explanation we do not provide the coefficients on the 18 industry dummy variables. It also turns out that they are not statistically significant. In Panel B, we present the results of an F-test that the multiple regression coefficients under the respective hypotheses are jointly equal to zero. These results support the argument that attorneys from more reputable law firms prefer to have jury waiver clauses in order to reduce the variance in outcomes and errors made by less knowledgeable juries (as compared to judges). The results are also against the argument that more reputable law firms prefer juries because they are more confident of their litigation skill.
***
We find no evidence for the hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a statistically significant impact on the probability of having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement. These results show no support for lawyers from the same state, or lawyers that are from the same state where the firm is headquartered having a higher likelihood of a jury waiver clause. An F-test rejects the null hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a statistically significant effect on the probability of having a jury waiver clause.
We find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis across all three regression specifications. A large acquirer taking over a small target firm (Relative size is low) generates a higher probability of having a jury waiver clause, or conversely, a merger between equal size firms lowers the probability of having a jury waiver clause.
We find no evidence that jury waiver clauses are more prevalent when the bidder is an international firm that is traded on the U.S. stock market. We also find that whether the deal was completed or not had a statistically insignificant effect on the likelihood of having a jury waiver clause. Finally, we find statistically insignificant industry effects that are jointly uncorrelated with the probability of having a jury waiver clause.
We now construct a parsimonious model of the statistically significant variables that we found in Table 5 , for modeling the choice of having a jury waiver clause. The results of this model are given in Table 6 . Consistent with the results noted above, we find that merger partners who specify New York as the governing law and forum state, who are represented by high reputation law firms, and are unequal size merger partners, increase the probability of having a jury waiver clause. These results show strong support for the choice of forum and law, the lawyer reputation, and bargaining power hypotheses.
***Table 6***
Although we removed all mergers wherein Delaware was chosen as the choice of forum and law, we examine whether other states have Chancery courts that sit without a jury. We find five other states that have such courts. These states are Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee, respectively. We find 14 mergers whose choice of forum and law is from these states. In Table 7 , we repeat our regressions excluding these 14 observations and find no significant change in our results.
***Table 7***
In summary, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state and as governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely to include a jury waiver clause, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer's law firm than for the target's law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.
Conclusions
This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals over an 11-year period (2001 to 2011) to determine the ex ante choice to include a jury waiver clause in a merger and acquisition deal. We extend and improve on the EM study. We find that jury waiver clauses are quite common in merger agreements with 48.2% (133) of the deals having such a clause.
We find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state and as governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely to include a jury waiver clause, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer's law firm than for the target's law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.
The most significant finding is that jury waiver clauses are positvely correlated with the choice of New York as the governing law and New York as the forum state.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that parties choose jury waiver clauses inorder to reduce the back end costs of litigation, especially the costs of contract interpretation disputes. As noted above, New York follows the traditional, textualist approach to contract interpretation (Schwartz & Scott 2010) . Textualist interpretation permits legally sophisticated commercial parties to economize on contracting costs by shifting costs from the back end of the contracting process (the enforcement function)
where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front end of the contracting process (the negotiating and design function) where the parties specify the extent to which context will count. 24 Parties can do this, for example, by drafting a merger clause that integrates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the written contract and then having the court apply a plain meaning interpretation to those contract terms that are facially unambiguous. Importantly, when parties fully integrate the agreement and use a merger clause, an interpretation dispute over contract terms may be resolved on summary judgment, thereby substantially reducing ex post enforcement costs (Schwartz & Scott 2010) .
The reduction in the chance of an expensive trial, in turn, reduces the settlement value of a claim, and therefore the incentive for a disappointed party to pursue opportunistic litigation in the first place.
If instead a court decides to consider additional context evidence, it must necessarily deny a motion for summary judgment and set the case for full trial on the merits. Thus, if litigation cost is considered, there is a strong argument that in cases where uncertainty is low and risks can be allocated in advance, many legally sophisticated commercial parties prefer textualist interpretation so that disputes can be resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial and the skewed incentives that derive from the anticipation of these costs (Schwartz & Scott 2010) . Such parties will rationally invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure that a court interpreting the written document together with the pleadings and briefs will be able to arrive at the "correct interpretation" more often than not. 25 Here the simple comparison is between the costs of drafting and the costs of a trial. A jury waiver clause is an additional element in this strategy. Should a New York court deny the defendant's claim for summary judgment (say, for example, on the ground that the contract language is ambiguous), the trial will proceed without a jury thereby reducing, by some margin, total litigation costs. This is consistent with the finding that the positive correlation between law firm reputation and jury waivers is driven by New York law firms. In addition, the capacity of a lawyer to mount sophisticated legal arguments that are more likely to persuade a judge during a bench trial is increasing in the lawyer's skill and experience and thus increasing in the reputation of the law firm. Additional support for this inference is provided by the finding that jury waiver clauses are positively correlated with a large acquirer taking over a smaller target. The relative size of the acquirer is increasing in its ability, ceteris paribus, to bargain for a jury waiver clause both for efficiency reasons and also to negate any distributional advantage that might attend a small target's ability to persuade a jury that they were exploited by the large acquirer in the merger agreement. 
